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~~SECRET~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

December 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVIS, SAFUSR

SUBJECT: Response to Dr. Tucker

Gardiner Tucker provided Dr. McLucas comments on an anti-satellite capability (Tab A) which were partially incorporated in our input to PFIAB.

Just before he left, Dr. McLucas drafted a note for Tucker (Tab B). It was suggested that I sign it for Dr. McLucas but I think it would be more appropriate for you to sign it since it is not strictly NRO business.

For what it is worth, I took issue with Tucker's paper with the author, Herb Benington. My complaint was that Tucker talks about a scenario which is almost a full scale space war while our concern is more with a scenario akin to the U-2 shoot down where the impact is as much political harassment as it is determined interference. Tucker is incorrect in saying we don't know about Soviet anti-satellite capability. The NIE credits them with a very effective non-nuclear capability derived from GALOSH but concludes they are not likely to implement or use the capability. Although Soviet interference is unlikely the consequences of even a single shoot down would be severe and a limited U. S. anti-satellite capability might be of deterrent value. This limited capability could be non-nuclear, only a few interceptors, not first pass but even limited to favorable, well identified, COSMOS recce satellites and need not be on standby status but could even take a month or so to get ready and still be a useful deterrent.

TAI
B

TAI
A

I think Dr. McLucas agrees at least to the point of being willing to encourage more examination of techniques.

Atch: Memo Geer to Allen
& memo for signature

Lew Allen, Jr.
Director

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08 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. TUCKER, ODDR&E

SUBJECT: Antisatellite Capability

Dr. Seamans has reviewed our submission to PFIAB and thinks that we are doing what we ought to do for the time being. On the other hand, he thinks that we should develop a non-nuclear kill capability, and he believes that both the Army and the Air Force should be offered the opportunity to make a proposal for an antisatellite system. He suggests that DDR&E should ask both Army and Air Force to develop a plan which would lead to an antisatellite capability and then have these evaluated by DDR&E. Presumably, the Army system would be based on an add-on to Safeguard; the Air Force system might be independent or it might also be one which could be adapted to the Safeguard system. It is possible that the R&D phase could be conducted independently of Safeguard, even though the eventual system would draw on Safeguard. I would appreciate your comments on Dr. Seamans' suggestion.

Harry Davis

John L. McLucas

Under Secretary of the Air Force

for

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